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Abstract
Elaborate protocols in Secure Multi-party Computation enable several participants to compute a
public function of their own private inputs while ensuring that no undesired information leaks about
the private inputs, and without resorting to any trusted third party. However, the public output of the
computation inevitably leaks some information about the private inputs. Recent works have introduced
a framework and proposed some techniques for quantifying such information flow. Yet, owing to their
complexity, those methods do not scale to practical situations that may involve large input spaces. The
main contribution of the work reported here is to formally investigate the information flow captured by
the min-entropy in the particular case of secure three-party computations of affine functions in order to
make its quantification scalable to realistic scenarios. To this end, we mathematically derive an explicit
formula for this entropy under uniform prior beliefs about the inputs. We show that this closed-form
expression can be computed in time constant in the inputs sizes and logarithmic in the coefficients of the
affine function. Finally, we formulate some theoretical bounds for this privacy leak in the presence of
non-uniform prior beliefs.
Keywords: Computational Privacy, Min-entropy, Combinatorics.
1 Introduction
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) is a domain of cryptography that aims at enabling several parties to
compute a public function of their own private inputs, while keeping the inputs secret and without resorting
to any trusted third party [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Multi-party secure protocols typically require the parties to
engage in a series of rounds of communication in order to exchange their information so as to be able to
collaboratively compute the intended output. Such protocols provide the guarantee that none of the parties
will be able to infer any information about the other parties’ input, other than the information conveyed by
the public output itself.
Paradoxically, as a function of the inputs, the public output inevitably leaks some information about
those private inputs. This leakage is considered as an inherent consequence of the primary objective of
SMC: it is commonly qualified as the “acceptable leakage” and its study is thus largely ignored in the SMC
literature [7, 8, 9, 10]. Recent works have been undertaken with the aim of quantifying such information
flows [11, 12, 13]. By adapting techniques from Quantitative Information Flow (QIF) and applying concepts
from Information Theory (IT) to the context of SMC, they introduce an attack model and a general notion
of entropy that enable us not only to reason about the acceptable leakage in SMC, but also to construct
bespoke privacy-enhancing mechanisms aimed at protecting the inputs’ secrecy. In this attack model, the
entropy of a targeted input reflects the amount of information that is gained by an attacker once the output
is revealed.
Although these techniques offer a rich framework designed for analysing information flows in SMC, their
computation is essentially combinatorial, and their application in practice is thus impeded by the scalability
of computing this combinatorics. Indeed, in the general case, the time complexity of computing such entropy
measures is quadratic in the product of the inputs sizes, making them inadequate for examining real world
applications of SMC that may involve large input spaces. We believe however, that developing techniques that
can perform such analyses efficiently would benefit and complement the extensive researches [14, 15, 16, 17]
that are being conducted on efficient SMC protocols: potential participants of an SMC would not only have
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efficient cryptographic protocols at their disposal, but they could also effectively run privacy analyses in order
to precisely estimate the risk that they would run by entering the computation.
In this paper, our objective is to focus our efforts on a particular class of functions for which we further
investigate those analyses in order to make them applicable to arbitrarily large input spaces. More precisely,
we focus on secure three-party computations, and we study the class of functions that are affine in the target’s
and the spectator’s inputs, while the amount of information that an attacker gains on a targeted input will be
measured by means of conditional min-entropy. In this setting, the main contribution of this work is to reduce
the combinatorial essence of this information measure to a closed-form expression that has time complexity
constant in the inputs sizes, and logarithmic in the coefficients of the affine function. More specifically, we
show that under uniform prior beliefs, the conditional min-entropy can be reduced to a simple function of the
size of the output domain, for which we then derive an explicit expression. Finally, as this reduction is valid
under uniform prior beliefs on the inputs, we also exhibit some explicit bounds for this information measure
in the presence of non-uniform prior beliefs.
Outline of Paper. We present an intuitive overview of our main contributions and of the key technical
aspects of our work in Section 2. We discuss some related works in Section 3. The mathematical formalisation
required for analysing information flows in secure three-party affine computations is introduced in Section
4. In Section 5, we show that the information gained by an attacker under uniform prior beliefs is entirely
determined by the size of the output domain, for which we derive a closed-form expression. Explicit bounds
for the information flow under non-uniform prior beliefs are presented in Section 6. We illustrate those
theoretical results in Section 7 and Section 8 concludes the paper.
Notations. Let D be a discrete set. We denote by |D| the cardinality of set D. Let Ω(D) be the set of all
probability distributions whose support is contained in D. Throughout, we present distributions as Python
dictionaries with domain values as keys and associated probabilities as values. For example, {4: 12 , 8: 12}
represents the uniform distribution over {4, 8}. For any integers a and b, we will write Ja; bK for the set of
consecutive integers ranging from a to b, namely {a, a+1, · · · , b}. The greatest common divisor of a and b will
be denoted as gcd(a, b). The fact that two integers i and j have same residue modulo another integer k will
be denoted as i = j mod k. Given random variable X and value x, the event “X = x” will be abbreviated
by “x” when there is no ambiguity, and its probability will be denoted by p(x). Similarly, we will abbreviate∑
x∈D by
∑
x when the domain D is obvious from context. Finally, the logarithm in base 2 will be denoted
as log.
2 Methodology
In this section, we present an overview of our main contributions and we highlight the key technical com-
ponents of our work intuitively. Although the aim of this section is to illustrate and summarise our results,
the detailed and rigorous approach is developed in Sections 4, 5 and 6. This work is motivated by Secure
Multi-party Computation, which requires all the manipulated values to belong to finite spaces. Thus, we will
focus on integer values ranged in finite intervals.
The main contribution of this work is to introduce an efficient and scalable way of quantifying the
acceptable leakage in three-party affine computations. To this effect, we consider the secure computation
of a public function f performed on three private inputs x, y and z. We wish to quantify the amount of
information that an attacker, who has control of or is being able to eavesdrop on the value of x, would
gain on input y once the output of f is revealed. We focus on the functions f whose output o can, once
the input x controlled by the attacker is fixed, be expressed as a function of y and z, in its simplest form,
as o = f(y, z) = βy + γz where β and γ are constant integers. We quantify the information gained by
the attacker from this computation by H(Y | O), the min-entropy of input y given output o, considered as
random variables. When inputs Y and Z are considered as random variables uniformly distributed on some
intervals, we show in Section 5.1 that this entropy can be reduced to an explicit formula involving NO, the
number of possible values that output O can take. The main difficulty now resides in deriving a closed-form
formula for NO, the focus of Section 5.2, and for which we sketch an intuitive explanation now. Given that
Y and Z are uniformly distributed on respective intervals IY and IZ , we show that those intervals can be
assumed to be of the form IY = J0;nK and IZ = J0;mK respectively, where n and m are positive integers. We
also show that a simple simplification enables us to assume that constants β and γ are positive and coprime.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of set A = {βy + γz | (y, z) ∈ J0;nK × J0;mK} of feasible outputs under
parameters β = 3, γ = 4, n = 7,m = 6.
The number of outputs NO can now be expressed as the following cardinal NO = |A| where we define set A
as:
A = {βy + γz | (y, z) ∈ J0;nK× J0;mK}
For the sake of our later explanation, we will define for all i in J0;nK, the set Ai as:
Ai = {βi+ γz | z ∈ J0;mK}
so that set A can now be expressed as:
A =
n⋃
i=0
Ai
In order to illustrate our method and theorems for computing the cardinal |A|, we will construct some
graphical representations of set A under different configurations in the following examples.
Example 1. Let β = 3, γ = 4, n = 7 and m = 6. The graphical representation of the corresponding set A
is shown in Figure 1. The y-axis corresponds to the values of y, which is ranged in J0; 7K, while the x-axis
corresponds to the possible values that the output can take. For each row, indexed by i ∈ J0; 7K, we mark by
a cross the possible values that the output o = βi + γz can take. In other words, each row i will represent
the elements contained in set Ai. As A is defined as the union of all the Ai, the set A corresponds to the
projection of all the crosses onto the x-axis. In other words, value o belongs to set A if and only if there is
at least one cross in column o.
In order to tally the number of feasible outputs, we will highlight some intuitive results, which we will
formalise and prove in Section 5.2. We first notice that the number of outputs is upper bounded by (n +
1)(m+ 1), and may be strictly lower than this bound since one column may contain several crosses. We will
refer to such columns containing more than 1 cross as intersections. We make the following observations:
1. The “first” intersection occurs at column βγ = 12 and is highlighted in red in Figure 1. In other words,
the lowest output o whose column contains at least two crosses is o = βγ.
2. We indicate in blue the first cross of the last row, indexed at column βn = 21, and in orange the last
cross of the first row, indexed at column γm = 24. We notice that the first intersection can occur
if and only if both of those crosses, highlighted in blue and orange, do not stand before the column
highlighted in red. In other words, the first intersection can occur if and only if βn ≥ βγ and γm ≥ βγ,
i.e. if n ≥ γ and m ≥ β, which we claim in Lemma 3. If one of those conditions is not satisfied, then
there is no intersection, and the number of outputs is (n + 1)(m + 1), which we claim in Corollary 1
and illustrate in the next example.
3. Set A is “symmetrical”, i.e. that for all output o in J0;βn+ γmK, we have:
o ∈ A ⇐⇒ βn+ γm− o ∈ A
where βn+ γm is the largest output obtained for maximal values of y and z. This is proved in Lemma
5.
3
4. Thus, the last intersection occurs at column βn+ γm− βγ and is highlighted in purple. Together with
observation 1, this constitutes the content of Lemma 4. Moreover, by symmetry, there is the same
number of outputs contained in J0;βγ − 1K and Jβn+ γm− βγ + 1;βn+ γmK, as claimed in Corollary
2.
5. As there is no intersection before the red column βγ, the number of outputs contained in J0;βγ − 1K
can be obtained by summing the number of elements of all Ai contained in this interval. More formally,
we have:
|A ∩ J0;βγ − 1K| = n∑
i=0
|Ai ∩ J0;βγ − 1K|
This corresponds to the total number of crosses that stand before the column highlighted in red. We
develop its computation in Theorem 1.
6. Finally, we observe that all the columns lying between the red and purple ones, i.e. ranging in the
interval Jβγ;βn+ γm− βγK, contain at least one cross. This result is formalised in Theorem 2 and
implies that:
|A ∩ Jβγ;βn+ γm− βγK| = βn+ γm− 2βγ + 1
In order to prove that all such columns contain at least one cross, we make the following reasoning.
(a) Two sets Ai whose indices are separated by a multiple of γ will only contain some outputs that
have the same residue modulo γ. More precisely, if i and j are both congruent to some k modulo
γ, then the elements of Ai and Aj will be congruent to βk modulo γ. We illustrate this fact in
Figure 1, where we color in green the elements of sets A1 and A5. We can notice that all those
elements are congruent to 1β modulo γ.
(b) For all k in J0; γ − 1K, let us define Bk as the union of all the Ai whose index i is congruent to k
modulo γ:
Bk =
⋃
i=k mod γ
Ai
For example, B1 can be represented as the projection of all the green crosses on the x-axis. Then,
we can see that each Bk includes all the outputs that are ranged between the red and purple
columns and that are congruent to βk modulo γ. This observation is formalised in Lemmas 6 and
7. We can indeed see in the figure that {15, 19, 23, 27, 31} ⊆ A1 ∪ A5 = B1. We notice that this
may not be the case outside of the domain delimited by the red and purple columns as for example
47 /∈ A1 ∪A5.
(c) Finally, as formally explained in Theorem 2, we claim that for all output o ranged between the
red and purple columns, there exists a k in J0; γ − 1K such that o ∈ Bk. Indeed, if we denote by
r the residue of o modulo γ, it suffices to choose k = β−1r to ensure that βk = r mod γ, which
then implies o ∈ Bk. While β−1 refers to the inverse of β modulo γ, such an operation is allowed
since β and γ are coprime. For example, output o = 17 has residue r = 1 modulo γ = 4. In this
case, we can choose k = β−1r = 3−1 · 1 = 3 and we can verify that o ∈ B3. This concludes our
intuition and ensures that all column ranged between the red and purple one will contain at least
one cross.
Finally, Theorem 4 and Corollary 4 derive some lower and upper bounds for H(Y | O) when prior beliefs
on the inputs are not uniform.
Example 2. Let β = 3, γ = 4, n = 3 and m = 6. In the graphical representation of the corresponding set A
that is displayed in Figure 2, we can notice that the blue cell representing βn appears before the red column
βγ, meaning that the condition n ≥ γ ∧m ≥ β is not satisfied. This implies that there is no intersection in
this setting and that |A| = (n+ 1)(m+ 1) = 28.
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of set A = {βy + γz | (y, z) ∈ J0;nK × J0;mK} of feasible outputs under
parameters β = 3, γ = 4, n = 3,m = 6.
3 Related Works
In this section, we discuss related work that constitutes the foundations and the motivations of our present
work.
3.1 Secure Multi-party Computation
Secure Multi-party Computation [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] is a domain of cryptography that provides advanced protocols
which enable several participants to compute a public function of their own private inputs without having
to rely on any other trusted third party or any external authority. Those protocols enable the participants
to compute a function in a decentralised manner, while ensuring that no information leaks about the private
inputs, other than that which can be inferred from the public output. The commonly called “acceptable
leakage” which is further studied in this paper, is the information that can be inferred from an attacker
about the other inputs given the knowledge of the public output. Secure multi-party computation is not
the only domain that is subject to an acceptable leakage. In particular, the results of our work are also
applicable to other fields or scenarios that aim at protecting the inputs’ privacy and that involve the opening
of a public output, such as outsourced computation where a trusted third party is privately sent all the inputs
and returns the public output as unique piece of information, or trusted computing where the parties input
their secret data into hardware security modules, which then ensure that no unintended information will be
accessible to the other parties.
3.2 Quantitative Information Flow
The purpose of Quantitative Information Flow (QIF) [18, 19] is to provide frameworks and techniques based
on information theory and probability theory for measuring the amount of information that leaks from a
secret. Different mathematical concepts have emerged in order to convey varied and precise information
about a secret: Shannon entropy [20] reflects the minimum number of binary questions required to recover
a secret on average, while the min-entropy is an indicator of the probability to guess a secret in one try
[21, 22, 18]. Richer measures such as Re´nyi entropy [23] and the g-entropy [24] have been introduced in order
to quantify some specific properties of a secret, and more general entropies have been proposed in order to
unify those different concepts [12, 25]. In this work, we will measure the information gained by an attacker
by means of min-entropy, which is used extensively in cryptography in order to quantify the vulnerability of
a secret.
3.3 Differential Privacy
Differential Privacy (DP) [26, 27] formalises privacy concerns and introduces techniques that provide users
of a database with the assurance that their personal details will not have a significant impact on the output
of the queries performed on the database. More precisely, it proposes mechanisms which ensure that the
outcome of the queries performed on two databases differing in at most one element will be statistically
indistinguishable. Moreover, minimising the distortion of the outcome of the queries while ensuring privacy
is an important trade-off that governs DP. Although DP is particularly adapted for guaranteeing privacy in
statistical computations involving a large number of parties, its effectiveness diminishes when a small number
of parties are involved in the computation. For example, in a two-party computation, a DP mechanism would
ensure that the output would not be sensibly affected when half of the data is changed. In this case, the
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utility of the computed function is thus be drastically hindered by the low number of parties. Unlike DP and
other works that have been conducted on trading off privacy and utility in SMC, this work does not intend
to enhance the inputs privacy. Instead, our objective is to propose an efficient method for quantifying the
privacy risks that a certain kind of computations presents.
3.4 Information Flow in Secure Multi-party Computation
Recent works [11, 12, 13] have adapted techniques stemming from QIF to the setting of SMC in order to
propose a model that allows us to reason about the acceptable leakage. In this model, the set of parties
willing to compute a public function f is partitioned into three sets: a set of attackers, a set of targets and a
set of spectators, holding the respective input vectors xA, xT and xS. The attackers are those parties willing
to share the value of their inputs and to take advantage of the public output of the computation f(xA,xT,xS)
in order to learn as much information as possible on their targets’ inputs, while the remaining parties are
called spectators. From the point of view of the attackers, the inputs xT and xS are unknown values and
are thus modelled as random variables XT and XS, further deemed to be independent since targets and
spectators are supposed to be honest parties who provide their inputs without being influenced by any other
information. The attackers’ prior belief on those inputs will represent the prior distributions piT and piS of
those random variables. The output of the function f is then also considered as a random variable defined
as O = f(xA, XT, XS). The privacy of the targeted parties is then expressed as the conditional entropy
H(XT | xA, O) of the targeted inputs given knowledge of the attackers’ inputs and the conditional knowledge
of the output. The choice of the entropy measure H depends on the users’ privacy concerns and is left general
in [12] to this end. In this work and for clarity purposes, we will choose to convey the inputs’ privacy by
means of min-entropy, as in many cryptographic scenarios, although our analyses can be adapted to more
general entropy measures. Under this assumption, the privacy of the targeted parties becomes:
H(XT | xA, O) = − log
∑
o
p(o | xA) ·max
xT
p(xT | xA, o)
= − log
∑
o
max
xT
p(xT) · p(o | xA,xT) (1)
by virtue of Bayes theorem. Moreover, as XT and XS are independent, we know that:
p(o | xA,xT) =
∑
xS
f(xA,xT,xS)=o
p(xS)
If we denote by n and m the size of the domains of XT and XS respectively, we know that computing
one p(o | xA,xT) has complexity O(m) and thus computing each maxxT p(xT) · p(o | xA,xT) has complexity
O(nm). Moreover, in the worst case, i.e. if f is injective, the output domain will have a size of nm, which
yields an overall complexity in O(n2m2) for the computation of H(XT | xA, O). In conclusion, although recent
works have introduced a framework for characterising and quantifying the acceptable leakage, its computation
cost is quadratic in the product of the inputs sizes in general, which prevents those privacy analyses to be
applicable in practice, and this major complexity issue constitutes the focus of this paper.
4 Information Flow Analysis in Secure Three-Party Affine Com-
putations
Let us consider three parties X , Y and Z holding the respective private inputs x, y and z. Let f be a public
function of three variables. We assume that the parties wish to enter the secure computation of f(x, y, z) and
that X is attacking Y under spectator Z. From the point of view of attacker X , although x is a known and
constant value, the inputs y and z appear as unknown values and will be modelled as random variables Y
and Z. Parties Y and Z are supposed to be honest parties who will not collaborate. Thus, random variables
Y and Z are deemed to be independent. We further assume that the target’s and spectator’s inputs are from
finite intervals IY and IZ :
Y ∈ IY , Z ∈ IZ
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Their prior probability distributions piY and piZ will represent the prior beliefs that X may have on those
values, such that piY ∈ Ω(IY ) and piZ ∈ Ω(IZ). We note that the absence of prior belief may be represented
as uniform prior distributions. Finally, we assume that function f is affine in the target’s and spectator’s
inputs, i.e. that we can choose three constant integers α, β and γ so as to express the output of f as:
f(x, y, z) = α+ βy + γz
Note that constants α, β and γ may be function of input x, which is also considered as a constant.
Admissible candidates for such affine functions f can for example be defined as f(x, y, z) = 3y + 4z or
f(x, y, z) = x2 + xy + (x3 − 2)z.
Assumption 1. From the attacker’s point of view, input x is a known value and will thus be considered as
a constant throughout this paper.
Thus, we may abuse notation by omitting the first argument of f , we refer to its output o as:
o = f(y, z) = α+ βy + γz
while we define the corresponding random variable O for the output as O = f(Y,Z) = α + βY + γZ. We
also introduce the output domain DO as:
DO = {f(y, z) | (y, z) ∈ IY × IZ}
By denoting the min-entropy by H, the amount of information that the attacker gains on the targeted
input once the output is revealed will be quantified by H(Y | x,O). Since the value of x will also be considered
as a public constant in the present privacy analyses, we will refer to this quantity as H(Y | O), which develops
as:
H(Y | O) = − log V(Y | O)
where the Bayes vulnerability of Y given O is defined as:
V(Y | O) =
∑
o
p(o) ·max
y
p(y | o) (2)
=
∑
o
max
y
p(y) · p(o | y)
To conclude this section and in order to simplify the following development, we will examine the particular
case when β or γ is zero.
Lemma 1. 1. If β = 0 then H(Y | O) = H(Y ).
2. If β 6= 0 and γ = 0 then H(Y | O) = 0.
Proof. 1. If β = 0 then clearly no information about Y leaks from O and thus H(Y | O) = H(Y ). More
formally, in this case, Y and O are independent and thus Equation (2) becomes:
V(Y | O) = ∑o p(o) ·maxy p(y) = 1 ·H(Y )
2. If β 6= 0 and γ = 0 then Y is entirely determined by O given the relation y = o−αβ and thus H(Y | O) = 0.
More formally, for all o in DO, there exists one y in IY such that p(y | o) = 1 and thus Equation (2)
becomes:
V(Y | O) = ∑o p(o) · 1 = 1
Assumption 2. In the rest of the paper, we will assume that β and γ are non-zero.
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5 Privacy under uniform prior beliefs
5.1 Reducing the entropy expression
In this section, we study the case where the attacker has no prior belief on the target’s and spectator’s inputs,
i.e. when piY and piZ are uniform on IY and IZ respectively. In other words, we assume that for all y in IY
and z in IZ , we have p(y) =
1
|IY | and p(z) =
1
|IZ | . As piY is uniform, we have:
V(Y | O) =
∑
o
max
y
p(y) · p(o | y)
=
1
|IY | ·
∑
o
max
y
p(o | y)
However, by definition, we know that for all output o in DO, there exists at least one pair (y, z) in IY ×IZ
that satisfies f(y, z) = o. For all such pairs, as Y and Z are independent, we have:
p(o | y) =
∑
z′∈IZ
f(y,z′)=o
p(z′)
= p(z)
since for a given o and y, there is at most one z′ that satisfies f(y, z′) = o as f is affine and γ is non-zero.
Consequently, p(o | y) = 1|IZ | since piZ is uniform, and thus:
V(Y | O) = NO|IY | · |IZ | (3)
where NO denotes the cardinal of DO. Our aim will now be to compute NO.
We mention four simplifications before analysing this problem in more details.
Assumption 3. 1. We first notice that deducting constant α from the output of f does not affect the
number of different outputs, which enables us to simplify f as f(y, z) = βy + γz.
2. Now, let us assume that interval IY is of the form IY = Ja; bK. By substituting variable y to variable
y′ = y − a, we can rewrite the expression of f as f(y′, z) = βa + βy′ + γz. The new variable y′ is
ranged in J0; b− aK and we can again deduct constant βa from the output. We can perform the same
reasoning with variable z, which enables us to assume without loss of generality that inputs y and z
belong to some intervals of the form J0;nK, J0;mK.
3. We now show that integers β and γ can be assumed to be positive without loss of generality. If both
β and γ are negative, then we can equivalently compute the number of outputs of function f ′(y, z) =
−f(y, z) = −βy − γz which has positive coefficients. If β < 0 and γ > 0, we can write f as f(y, z) =
βn − β(n − y) + γz. However, the input space J0;nK of variable Y is equal to that of n − Y , and we
can thus equivalently study function f ′(y, z) = −βy + γz whose coefficients are positive. Conversely, if
β > 0 and γ < 0, we can again equivalently study f ′(y, z) = −f(y, z), which is tackled in the previous
case.
4. Let us denote by d the greatest common divisor of β and γ. We know that d can be computed in
O(log(β + γ)). Function f can be factorised as f(y, z) = d · f ′(y, z) where f ′(y, z) = β′y + γ′z where
β′ and γ′ are coprime. However, functions f and f ′ have the same number of outputs. We can thus
assume that the coefficients of the affine function are coprime provided that we have computed their
greatest common divisor.
5.2 Measuring the size of the output domain
For the sake of clarity, this technical subsection will be developed so as to be self-contained.
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Let n, m be two non-negative integers and β and γ be two positive integers. Let us also assume that β
and γ are coprime. The aim is to calculate the cardinal NO of the set A defined as follows:
A = {βy + γz | (y, z) ∈ J0;nK× J0;mK}
We can first notice that |A| is positive and upper bounded by (n+ 1)(m+ 1). The difficulty is that two
different pairs (y, z) and (y′, z′) in J0;nK× J0;mK can satisfy βy + γz = βy′ + γz′, and thus |A| will often be
lower than (n+ 1)(m+ 1). We also notice that A ⊆ J0;βn+ γmK, and thus we also have |A| ≤ βn+ γm+ 1.
Notations:. For any real x, the floor of x will be denoted by bxc while dxe will denote its ceiling. The fact
that two integers i and j have same residue modulo another integer k will be denoted as i = j mod k. For
all integers i and k, we will denote the equivalence class of i modulo k by [i]k = {j ∈ Z | j = i mod k}.
Recall 1. For all real numbers x, we have d−xe = −bxc.
Proof. Let x be a real number. We have:
−x ≤ d−xe < −x+ 1
and so:
x− 1 < −d−xe ≤ x
and thus, as −d−xe is integral:
−d−xe = bxc
Recall 2. Let p and q be two coprime natural numbers. We have:
q−1∑
k=1
bkp
q
c = (p− 1)(q − 1)
2
Proof. If q = 1 then the result is immediate since the sum adds up to 0. Let us now assume that q > 1. We
can notice that we have:
q−1∑
k=1
bkp
q
c =
q−1∑
k=1
bqp− kp
q
c
=
q−1∑
k=1
bp− kp
q
c
= (q − 1)p+
q−1∑
k=1
b−kp
q
c
and thus:
2
q−1∑
k=1
bkp
q
c = (q − 1)p+
q−1∑
k=1
(
bkp
q
c+ b−kp
q
c
)
(4)
However, because p and q are coprime we know that for all k in J1; q − 1K, we have gcd(k, q) = 1. As q > 1,
we thus know that for all k in J1; q − 1K, we have kqp /∈ Z and thus:
q−1∑
k=1
(
bkp
q
c+ b−kp
q
c
)
=
q−1∑
k=1
(−1)
= (q − 1)(−1)
and thus Equation (4) becomes:
2
q−1∑
k=1
bkp
q
c = (q − 1)p+ (q − 1)(−1)
= (q − 1)(p− 1)
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Recall 3. Let p and q be two coprime natural numbers. We have:⋃
j∈J0;q−1K[pj]q = Z
Proof. Let i and j be in J0; q − 1K. We have:
[pi]q = [pj]q ⇐⇒ p(i− j) = 0 mod q
⇐⇒ i = j mod q
since p and q are coprime. Thus, for all distinct i and j in J0; q − 1K, we have [pi]q 6= [pj]q and thus |{pj
mod q | j ∈ J0; q − 1K}| = q and therefore:⋃
j∈J0;q−1K[pj]q =
⋃
j∈J0;q−1K[j]q
= Z
Lemma 2. Let (y, z) and (y′, z′) be in J0;nK× J0;mK. We have:
βy + γz = βy′ + γz′ ⇐⇒ ∃k ∈ Z : (y′ = y + kγ ∧ z′ = z − kβ) (5)
Proof. Let (y, z) and (y′, z′) be in J0;nK× J0;mK. As β and γ are coprime, we have:
βy + γz = βy′ + γz′ ⇐⇒ β(y′ − y) = γ(z − z′)
⇐⇒ (∃k ∈ Z : y′ − y = kγ) ∧ (β(y′ − y) = γ(z − z′))
⇐⇒ ∃k ∈ Z : (y′ = y + kγ ∧ z′ = z − kβ)
Lemma 3. Let (y, z) and (y′, z′) be two distinct pairs in J0;nK× J0;mK. We have:
βy + γz = βy′ + γz′ =⇒ n ≥ γ ∧m ≥ β (6)
Proof. Let (y, z) and (y′, z′) be two distinct pairs in J0;nK× J0;mK such that:
βy + γz = βy′ + γz′
By virtue of Lemma 2, we can take k in Z such that:
y′ − y = kγ ∧ z − z′ = kβ
As (y, z) and (y′, z′) are different, we further know that k is different from 0. This implies that:
|y′ − y| ≥ γ ∧ |z′ − z| ≥ β
But as y and y′ belong to J0;nK and z and z′ belong to J0;mK, we also know that:
|y′ − y| ≤ n ∧ |z′ − z| ≤ m
and thus:
n ≥ γ ∧m ≥ β
Corollary 1. If n < γ ∨m < β, then |A| = (n+ 1)(m+ 1).
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Proof. Let us assume that n < γ ∨m < β. Let us define the function g as g : (y, z) 7−→ βy+ γz with domainJ0;nK× J0;mK −→ J0;βn+ γmK. By virtue of Lemma 3, we know that the function g is injective. Thus, we
have:
|A| = |g(J0;nK× J0;mK)| = (n+ 1)(m+ 1)
Assumption 4. In the remainder of this section, we will now assume that n ≥ γ ∧m > β.
Lemma 4. Let o be in A. Let (y, z) and (y′, z′) be two distinct pairs in J0;nK× J0;mK. We have:
βy + γz = o ∧ βy′ + γz′ = o =⇒ o ∈ Jβγ;βn+ γm− βγK (7)
Proof. Let o be in A. Let (y, z) and (y′, z′) be two distinct pairs in J0;nK× J0;mK such that:
βy + γz = o ∧ βy′ + γz′ = o
By virtue of Lemma 2, we can take k in Z such that:
y′ = y + kγ ∧ z′ = z − kβ (8)
We further know that both pairs are distinct and we can thus choose k different from 0. Without loss of
generality, let us assume that (y, z) >2 (y
′, z′) where >2 refers to the lexicographic order on integer pairs. In
other words, let us assume that k > 0.
We know that z′ ≥ 0 and Equation (8) ensures that y′ ≥ γ since k > 0. As o = βy′ + γz′, we thus have
o ≥ βγ.
Conversely, we know that y′ ≤ n and Equation (8) ensures that z′ ≤ m−β since k > 0. As o = βy′+γz′,
we thus have:
o ≤ βn+ γ(m− β)
≤ βn+ γm− βγ
Theorem 1. We have:
|A ∩ J0;βγ − 1K| = βγ − (β − 1)(γ − 1)
2
(9)
Proof. By virtue of Lemma 4, we know that for all o in J0;βγ − 1K, and for all pairs (y, z) and (y′, z′) inJ0;nK2, we have:
βy + γz = o ∧ βy′ + γz′ = o =⇒ (y, z) = (y′, z′)
Thus:
|A ∩ J0;βγ − 1K| = |{(y, z) ∈ J0;nK× J0;mK | βy + γz ∈ J0;βγ − 1K}|
=
γ−1∑
y=0
|{z ∈ J0;mK | βy + γz ∈ J0;βγ − 1K}|
since βy + γz ≥ βγ for all z in J0;nK when y ≥ γ, and since n ≥ γ. Moreover, since m ≥ β, for all y inJ0; γ − 1K, we have:
|{z ∈ J0;mK | βy + γz ∈ J0;βγ − 1K}| = |{z ∈ J0;mK | γz ∈ J0;βγ − βy − 1K}|
= dβ(γ − y)
γ
e
= dβ − βy
γ
e
= β − bβy
γ
c
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by virtue of Recall 1. We thus have:
|A ∩ J0;βγ − 1K| = γ−1∑
y=0
(
β − bβy
γ
c
)
= βγ −
γ−1∑
y=0
bβy
γ
c
= βγ − (β − 1)(γ − 1)
2
by virtue of Recall 2 since β and γ are coprime.
Lemma 5. Let o be in J0;βn+ γmK. We have:
o ∈ A ⇐⇒ βn+ γm− o ∈ A (10)
Proof. Let o be in J0;βn+ γmK. We know that β and γ are coprime, so we can take two integers y and z in
Z such that:
o = βy + γz
and we have:
βn+ γm− o = β(n− y) + γ(m− z)
Now, we have:
(y, z) ∈ J0;nK× J0;mK ⇐⇒ (n− y,m− z) ∈ J0;nK× J0;mK
and thus:
o ∈ A ⇐⇒ βn+ γm− o ∈ A
Corollary 2. We have:
|A ∩ Jβn+ γm− βγ + 1;βn+ γmK| = βγ − (β − 1)(γ − 1)
2
(11)
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and Lemma 5.
Definition 1. 1. For all i in J0;nK, we define:
Ai = {βi+ γz | z ∈ J0;mK} (12)
so that A =
⋃n
i=0Ai.
2. For all j in J0; γ − 1K, we define:
Bj =
⋃
i∈J0;nK
i=j mod γ
Ai
=
bn−jγ c⋃
k=0
Aj+γk
so that A can be rewritten:
A =
⋃
j∈J0;γ−1KBj
Lemma 6. For all j in J0; γ − 1K, we have:
Bj = [βj]γ ∩ Jβj;β(j + γbn− j
γ
c) + γmK (13)
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Proof. Let j be in J0; γ − 1K. For all q in J0; bn−jγ cK, let us define the predicate Pq as follows:
Pq ≡
(
q⋃
k=0
Aj+γk = [βj]γ ∩ Jβj;β(j + γq) + γmK)
and let us prove by induction that Pq holds for all q in J0; bn−jγ cK.
By definition, we have:
0⋃
k=0
Aj+γk = Aj = [βj]γ ∩ Jβj;βj + γmK
and thus P0 holds.
Let q be in J0; bn−jγ c − 1K and let us assume that Pq holds.
By definition, we have:
Aj+γ(q+1) = [β(j + γ(q + 1))]γ ∩ Jβ(j + γ(q + 1));β(j + γ(q + 1)) + γmK
= [βj]γ ∩ Jβ(j + γ(q + 1));β(j + γ(q + 1)) + γmK
This equation, combined with the assumption that Pq holds, yields us:
q+1⋃
k=0
Aj+γk = [βj]γ ∩
(Jβj;β(j + γq) + γmK
∪Jβ(j + γ(q + 1));β(j + γ(q + 1)) + γmK) (14)
However, as m ≥ β, we know that:
β(j + γq) + γm ≥ β(j + γ(q + 1))
And so Equation (14) becomes:
q+1⋃
k=0
Aj+γk = [βj]γ ∩ Jβj;β(j + γ(q + 1)) + γmK
which means that Pq+1 holds, which enables us to conclude the induction.
Lemma 7. For all j in J0; γ − 1K, we have:
[βj]γ ∩ Jβγ;βn+ γm− βγK ⊆ Bj (15)
Proof. Let j be in J0; γ − 1K. Lemma 6 ensures that we have:
Bj = [βj]γ ∩ Jβj;β(j + γbn− j
γ
c) + γmK
First, we know that βj ≤ βγ. Let us now define S as the following statement:
S : βn+ γm− βγ ≤ β(j + γbn− j
γ
c) + γm (16)
We have the following equivalences:
S ⇐⇒ βn− βγ ≤ β(j + γbn− j
γ
c)
⇐⇒ n− γ ≤ j + γbn− j
γ
c
⇐⇒ n− j ≤ γbn− j
γ
c+ γ
⇐⇒ n− j
γ
≤ bn− j
γ
c+ 1 (17)
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By definition of the floor function, Equation (17) holds and by equivalence, Equation (16) thus also holds,
and so: Jβγ;βn+ γm− βγK ⊆ Jβj;β(j + γbn− j
γ
c) + γmK
and intersecting with [βj]γ yields us the expected result.
Theorem 2. We have: Jβγ;βn+ γm− βγK ⊆ A (18)
Proof. By definition, we have:
A =
⋃
j∈J0;γ−1KBj
Lemma 7 thus implies:
A ⊇
⋃
j∈J0;γ−1K
(
[βj]γ ∩ Jβγ;βn+ γm− βγK)
⊇
 ⋃
j∈J0;γ−1K[βj]γ
 ∩ Jβγ;βn+ γm− βγK
But as β and γ are coprime, Recall 3 ensures that:⋃
j∈J0;γ−1K[βj]γ = Z
which concludes the proof of the Theorem.
Theorem 3. We have:
NO = |A| = βn+ γm+ 1− (β − 1)(γ − 1) (19)
Proof. Let us define the intervals I1, I2 and I3 as follows:
I1 = J0;βγ − 1K
I2 = Jβγ;βn+ γm− βγK
I3 = Jβn+ γm− βγ + 1;βn+ γmK
We notice that (I1, I2, I3) forms a partition of J0;βn+ γmK and thus we can partition A into (A∩ I1, A∩
I2, A ∩ I3), which enables us to express the cardinal of A as the following sum:
|A| = |A ∩ I1|+ |A ∩ I2|+ |A ∩ I3| (20)
We already know by Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 that:
|A ∩ I1| = |A ∩ I3| = βγ − (β − 1)(γ − 1)
2
Moreover, Theorem 2 ensures that:
A ∩ I2 = I2
and thus:
|A ∩ I2| = |I2|
= βn+ γm− 2βγ + 1
and finally Equation (20) becomes:
|A| = βn+ γm− 2βγ + 1 + 2
(
βγ − (β − 1)(γ − 1)
2
)
= βn+ γm+ 1− (β − 1)(γ − 1)
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In the following corollary, we can now synthesise the previous results and realize one of our main objectives:
a closed-form expression for H(Y | O) under uniform prior beliefs.
Corollary 3. We consider a function f defined as f(y, z) = α+βy+γz with α, β and γ being three constant
integer values, with non-zero β and γ. We assume that Y and Z are ranged in the respective intervals IY
and IZ of size (n + 1) and (m + 1) respectively, and we assume that Y and Z are uniformly distributed on
those intervals. Let d be the greatest common divisor of β and γ, and let us define β′ = |βd | and γ′ = |γd |
where here |x| represents the absolute value of integer x. Then, we have:
H(Y | O) = − log β
′n+ γ′m+ 1− (β′ − 1)(γ′ − 1)
(n+ 1)(m+ 1)
(21)
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3 and Equation (3).
This gives us a method for quantifying the information leaks about a targeted party from the public
output of an SMC under uniform prior beliefs. This method requires a computational time that is constant
in the inputs size and logarithmic in the coefficients of the affine function due to the greatest common divisor
operation. In the next section, we show how we can reason about H(Y | O) when an attacker has some prior
beliefs about Y and Z.
6 Privacy bounds under non-uniform prior beliefs
In this section, we present some lower and upper bounds for H(Y | O) under non-uniform prior beliefs on the
target’s and the spectator’s input. The following theorem first imposes a lower bound.
Theorem 4. We have:
H(Y | O) ≥ H(Y ) + H(Z)− log(NO) (22)
with equality when Y and Z have uniform prior distributions.
Proof. We denote by NO the number of possible outputs, for which we recall that Theorem 3 yields an
explicit formula. By comparison between the 1-norm and the infinity-norm, we have:
V(Y | O) =
∑
o
max
y
p(y) · p(o | y)
≤ NO max
o
max
y
p(y) · p(o | y)
≤ NO max
y
p(y) ·
(
max
o
p(o | y)
)
But we know that:
∀y ∈ IY : max
o
p(o | y) = max
z
p(z)
and thus:
V(Y | O) ≤ NO max
y
p(y) ·max
z
p(z)
Taking the negative logarithm concludes the proof, and we can verify, with our bespoke explicit formula from
Equation (3), that we indeed have equality when Y and Z are uniformly distributed since then maxy p(y) =
1
|IY | and maxz p(z) =
1
|IZ | .
We will now study some upper bounds for H(Y | O). It is a known result on the min-entropy that
H(Y | O) ≤ H(Y ), i.e. that knowledge of the public output cannot increase the targeted input’s entropy.
We will now prove that H(Y | O) ≤ H(Z), i.e. the remaining entropy of Y given knowledge of O cannot be
larger than the prior entropy of the spectator’s input Z. To this end, we first state in the next theorem that
an attacker eavesdropping on the value of x and learning the public output will gain the same amount of
information on targeted input Y than on the spectator’s input Z.
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Theorem 5. We have:
H(Y | O) = H(Z | O) (23)
Proof. We have:
H(Y | O) =
∑
o
max
y
p(y)p(o | y)
For all o in DO, we define the set S
o of pairs that result in output o as:
So = {(y, z) ∈ IY × IZ | βy + γz = o}
We define its projections SoY and S
o
Z on its first and second components respectively as follows:
SoY = {y ∈ IY | ∃z ∈ IZ : (y, z) ∈ So}
SoZ = {z ∈ IZ | ∃y ∈ IY : (y, z) ∈ So}
Moreover, for all o in DO and y in DY , we know that p(y | o) is non zero only if there exists a z in DZ
such that (y, z) is in So. Thus:
H(Y | O) =
∑
o
max
y∈SoY
p(y)p(o | y)
Now, for all o in DO and y in S
o
Y , there exists a unique z in DZ such that βy + γz = o, determined by
z = o−βyγ and we have p(o | y) = p(z). Thus:
H(Y | O) =
∑
o
max
(y,z)∈So
p(y)p(z)
Conversely, for all o in DO and z in S
o
Z , there exists a unique y satisfying βy + γz = o and we have
p(o | z). Thus:
H(Y | O) =
∑
o
max
z∈SoZ
p(o | z)p(z)
And finally for all o in DO, we know that p(o | z) can only be non zero if z is in SoZ and thus:
H(Y | O) =
∑
o
max
z∈DZ
p(o | z)p(z)
= H(Z | O)
Corollary 4. We have:
H(Y | O) ≤ H(Z)
Proof. We have H(Z | O) ≤ H(Z) and Theorem 5 concludes the proof.
7 Examples
In this section, we illustrate the theoretical results previously obtained. We begin this section by presenting
an example which deepens our understanding of the behaviour of H(Y | O) under non-uniform prior beliefs.
We could intuitively posit that H(Y | O) is maximal when the prior distributions for Y and Z are uniform.
However, we refute this hypothesis in the following example.
Example 3. Let us consider the function f(y, z) = o = 2y + 3z, and let us assume that y in ranged in
IY = J0; 2K and z is ranged in IZ = J0; 1K. Let us consider piuY = {0 : 13 , 1 : 13 , 2 : 13} and piuZ = {0 : 12 , 1 : 12}
the uniform distributions for Y and Z on their respective domains. We also consider the following particular
distribution pi∗Y = {0 : 12 , 1 : 0, 2 : 12}.
Then, when Y and Z respectively follow the prior distributions piuY and pi
u
Z , we have H
u(Y | O) = − log( 56 ).
On the other hand, when Y and Z respectively follow the prior distributions pi∗Y and pi
u
Z , we get H
∗(Y | O) =
− log( 34 ).
We thus have H∗(Y | O) > Hu(Y | O) which contradicts the intuitive hypothesis.
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Figure 3: Illustration of H(Y | O) in the computation of function f(x, y, z) = (3x− 6)y+ (x2− 2x+ 6)z with
uniform prior beliefs piY and piZ over J0; 5× 1012K, when X attacks Y under spectator Z.
The next example presents a use case of Corollary 3.
Example 4. Let us consider three parties X , Y and Z holding respective private inputs x, y and z and willing
to enter the secure computation of a public function f defined as f(x, y, z) = (3x − 6)y + (x2 − 2x + 6)z.
We suppose that party X is attacking input y under spectator Z. We notice that when input x is fixed, the
function f is affine in y and z and we can thus apply our privacy analysis. We assume that Y and Z are
ranged in the input domain I = J0; 5× 1012K and we assume that X ’s prior beliefs piY and piZ on those inputs
are uniform over I. We plot in Figure 3 the values of H(Y | O) computed via Corollary 3, for the values
of input x ranged in J0; 30K. Note that although a small interval for the values of x has been chosen for
readability purposes, entropy H(Y | O) can be computed for any value of x. For an attacker X who is willing
to lie on his honest and intended input in order to learn as much information as possible on his targeted input
Y , he would have more incentive to enter some value x that produces low entropy. For example, he would
rather enter value x = 25 than x = 2. Conversely, targeted parties could consider such information so as to
evaluate the risk that they would face by entering the computation in the worst case, or on average.
Example 5. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we repeated the operations of the previous
example while letting the size of the input spaces IY and IZ vary, and by comparing the computational time that
different methods require to perform such analyses. More precisely, we computed the 31 values of H(Y | O)
in the same scenario as in the previous Example 4, but we let inputs Y and Z be ranged in the intervalsJ0; 5× 10pK for different values of p. We compared the time taken by the three following methods, which we
display in Figure 4.
1. Naive method: We use the combinatorial formula given in Equation (1) that has complexity O(n2m2).
2. Simplified method: We use the simplified formula of Equation (3) for affine functions under uniform
distributions, where NO is computed naively by enumerating the set of outputs, which yields complexity
O(nm).
3. Explicit method: We use the result of Corollary 3 which provides a constant time formula.
The variables n and m represent the size of the input spaces (minus 1) and are both set to 5 × 10p for
varying values of p. We set a time limit of 5 minutes and we mark by an infinity sign the computations
that timed out. We can notice that both naive methods rapidly time out as the input space grows whereas
our explicit formula enables us to perform privacy analyses in constant time for arbitrarily large input spaces
such as the one performed in Example 4. Those computations have been performed on an Intel(R) Core(TM)
i3-2350M CPU @ 2.30GHz, but are aimed at estimating the order of magnitude of those methods rather than
precisely assessing them individually.
In the following example, we now illustrate the lower and upper bounds that have been derived for
H(Y | O) under non-uniform prior beliefs.
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p Naive Simplified Explicit
0 9.1× 10−3 8.9× 10−4 1.5× 10−4
1 3.7× 10−1 1.7× 10−2 9.4× 10−5
2 32 1.9 1.2× 10−4
3 ∞ 216 9.9× 10−5
4 ∞ ∞ 1.2× 10−4
12 ∞ ∞ 1.2× 10−4
Figure 4: Computational time (in seconds) taken by our explicit formula compared to naive methods in the
privacy analysis of Example 4 with inputs ranged in J0; 5× 10pK for different values of p.
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Figure 5: Behaviour of H(Y | O) in the computation of function f(y, z) = y + z for Y and Z ranged in
I = J0; 50K, with piZ = ds(I, 0, w) and piY uniform over I.
Example 6. We consider the computation of f whose simplification, once x is fixed, is defined as f(y, z) =
y + z. We assume that Y and Z are ranged in the domain I = J0; 50K.
We define a spiked distribution ds parametrised by a domain D, a center c ∈ D and a weight w ∈ [0, 1]
as:
ds(D, c, w)[c] = w
ds(D, c, w)[x] =
1− w
|D| − 1 if x 6= c
In other words, distribution ds(D, c, w) allocates a probability w to the value c and distributes the remaining
probability uniformly amongst the other values of the domain D.
We suppose that Y is uniformly distributed over I and that Z follows distribution ds(I, 0, w) for different
weights w. We divide the interval [0, 1] into 50 values. For each w in those 50 values, we compute the exact
values of H(Y | O) and that of its bounds derived in the previous section. The value of H(Y | O) appears in
blue in Figure 5. Its lower bound stemming from Theorem 4 is drawn in red and its upper bound derived from
Corollary 4 is traced in green. Note that we considered small input spaces since H(Y | O) is here calculated
with a naive method, although its bounds can be computed efficiently for arbitrarily large input spaces.
8 Conclusion
Although extensive researches in Secure Multi-party Computation have considerably improved the efficiency
of cryptographic protocols, the quantification of the acceptable leakage is a problem that still requires deeper
investigations. Indeed, the computational complexity of those recently introduced privacy analyses does not
yet allow their application in practical situations that involve large input spaces. In this work, we focused
our attention on secure three-party computations of affine functions. We have formally investigated the
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behaviour of the acceptable leakage under uniform prior beliefs in order to obtain an explicit formula for
the min-entropy of the targeted input given conditional knowledge of the output. The calculation of this
closed-form expression requires a computational time that is constant in the inputs sizes and logarithmic in
the coefficients of the function, which enables the privacy analysis of such computations in practice. Finally,
we have derived some theoretical bounds for this acceptable leakage when the input prior distributions are
non-uniform in order to accommodate the potential prior belief that an attacker may have.
In the future, we would like to enlarge our understanding of the acceptable leakage in more general
settings. First, as our work is motivated by the privacy leaks that occur during SMC protocols, we tailored
our analyses for finite input spaces. However, it would be interesting to adapt our model and to design
some methods that can accommodate continuous input and output spaces. Moreover, although our current
analysis considers the computation of affine functions for three parties, it would be of interest to explore the
computation of affine functions for any number of parties.
We also mean to investigate more general functions that involve non-linear terms. It would be particularly
interesting to study the composition of our analyses of affine functions in order to use them as building blocks
for studying more complex functions. Finally, efficient and exact quantification of the acceptable leakage for
general functions may be hard to obtain simultaneously, and we would thus also be interested in providing
efficient methods for approximating the inputs privacy in general scenarios.
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